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CRIMINAL LAW
MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE
The defendant was indicted on a charge of second degree man-
slaughter, having killed the deceased while driving an automobile on a
road located on the grounds of the Longview Hospital, a state institu-
tion for the care of the insane. The jury found the defendant guilty of
driving while drunk and operating his car without due regard for the
safety and rights of the pedestrian. The case centered upon the question
of whether the driveway was "a road or highway" within the second-
degree manslaughter statute, Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 12404-1, 116 Ohio
Laws 205. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the defendant was not
guilty of a crime under the statute as the driveway was built, maintained
and controlled by the hospital for its own use and the public having
business therewith, and was never dedicated or legally accepted as a
street, township road, county or state highway within the purview of the
term, "roads or highways" as found in the statute. State v. Root, 132
Ohio St. 229, 6 N.E. (2d) 979 (1937), sustaining the Court of Ap-
peals in 54 Ohio App. 412, 7 N.E. (2d) 664, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 136, 8
Ohio Op. 166 (1936).
The Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the fact that the Gen-
eral Assembly never granted permission to establish a "street, alley, or
road" in the place where this driveway is located, as provided by the
Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 23, which reads: "a street, alley, or road shall not
be laid out or established through or over the lands belonging to a public
institution of the state without the special permission of the general
assembly."
The provisions of the Ohio Gen. Code Sec. 12401-I, under which
the defendant was indicted, are as follows: "Whoever shall unlawfully
and unintentionally kill another while engaged in the violation of any
law of this state applying to the use or regulation of traffic on, over,
or across roads or highways shall be guilty of manslaughter in the second
degree * * *."
To make a person amenable to the statute quoted, it is necessary
that the killing take place on a public road or highway. A highway has
been defined as a way open to the public at large without distinction,
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discrimination, or restriction, except such as is incident to regulations
calculated ot secure to the general public the largest practical benefit
therefrom and enjoyment thereof. Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich.
212, 22 Am. Rep. 522 (1876) ; Omaha & Street R. Co. v. City of
Omaha, 114 Neb. 4 83 , 208 N.W. 123 (1926); White Oak Coal Co.
v. City of Manchester, io9 Va. 749, 132 Am. St. Rep. 943 (1909),
64 S.E. 944; Bogue v. Bennett, 156 Ind. 478, 83 Am. St. Rep. 212
6o N.E. 143, (19oo); Dietz v. C. & M. Valley Traction Co., 4 Ohio
N.P. 399, 6 Ohio D.N.P. 513 (897); Sullivan v. Columbus, 12 Ohio
D.N.P. 65I (1902). Public highways are divided into three classes,
namely: state roads, county roads, and township roads. Ohio Gen. Code
Sec. 7464. The prime essentials of a highway are the right to common
enjoyment on the one hand and the duty of public maintenance on the
other hand. M/latter of Mayor, etc., of New York, 135 N. Y. 253,
31 N.E. 1043 (1892); 13 R.C.L. page 14. But, it has been held
that a road, established by public authority, is a public road even though
it is to be maintained at the expense of private individuals, so long as the
right to use the same is open to the general public. Shaver v. Starrett,
4 Ohio St. 494 (1855).
If a road is maintained at private expense for the benefit of particu-
lar individuals, it is a private road or way. Kister v. Reeser, 98 Pa. St. 1,
42 Am. Rep. 6o8 (i88i); St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 41
Okl. 163, 137 Pac. 714, 715 (i913); see 21 R.C.L., pages 1205-
1257 on "Private Ways"; see 13 R.C.L., page i6 for the distinction
between a highway and a private road or way. It is the right to travel
by all the world, and not the actual exercise of the right, which consti-
tutes a way a public highway. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Smith,
supra; Matter of Mayor, etc. of New York, supra. Thus, if it is open
to all, a way is a public highway even though it may accommodate only
a limited portion of the public or even a single family. Fanning v. Gilli-
land, 37 Ore. 369, 6i Pac. 636 (i9oo); Law v. Neola Elevator Co.,
281 Ill. 143, 117 N.E. 435 (1917)-
A public highway includes a cul-de-sac (a passage or place with only
one outlet such as a blind alley or dead end street). Law v. Neola Ele-
vator Co., supra; Carlin v. Chicago, 262 fll. 564, 104 N.E. 905
(1914); Sheaf v. People, 87 Ill. 189, 29 Am. Rep. 49 (1877); Schatz
v. Pfeil, 56 Vis. 429, 14 N.W. 628 (1883). Contra, People v. Jack-
so;z, 7 Mich. 432, 74 Am. Dec. 729 (1859). Streets of a town or city are
public highways. Morris v. Bowers, Wright (Ohio report) 749 (1834) ;
Youngstown v. Pittsburgh & TV. R. Co., 3 Ohio C.C. 214, 2 Ohio
C.D. 121 (i888); Parker v. City of Silverton, io9 Ore. 298, 220
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Pac. I39 (1923); Richmonds F. & P. R. Co. v. City of Richmond,
145 Va. 225, 133 S.E. 8oo (1926); Burns v. Kendall, 96 S. Car. 385,
8o S.E. 621 (1913); Schier v. State of Ohio, 96 Ohio St. 245, 117
N.E. 229 (1917). Generically the term, "street" includes sidewarks.
Gridley v. Bloomington, 88 Ill. 554, 30 Am. Rep. 566 (1878);
Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Redding, 124 Ark. 368, 187 S.W. 651
(i916); People v. Chamberis, 297 Ill. 455, 13o N.E. 712 (1921);
Noonan v. Stillwater, 33 Minn. 198, 22 N.W. 444 (1885). In fact,
it may embrace all that portion of a street from the building line to the
curbing, including grass plats or parking between the walk proper and
the curbing. Woodson v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 224 Mo. 685, 123
S.W. 820 (19o9). An alley laid out and established by public authority
is a public highway. State v. City of Montevideo, 142 Minn. 157, 171
N.W. 314, 316 (1919); O'Brien v. Burroughs ildding Mach. Co.,
191 Mo. App. 501, 177 S.W. 811 (1915); Osage City v. Larkin,
4o Kan. 2o6, 19 Pac. 658 (1888); Ferguson v. Yakima, 139 Wash.
216, 246 Pac. 287, 48 A.L.R. 431 (1926). A bridge erected for
public travel and accommodation is a public highway. Point Bridge Co.
v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 240 Pa. 105, 87 Adl. 614, 615 (1913); City
of Baraboo v. Dwyer, 166 Wis. 372, 165 N.W. 297, 299 (1917);
Carlin v. Chicago, supra.
The unintentional killing of another by gross negligence in the
doing of a lawful act is manslaughtere at common law. Clark and
Marshall, Crimes, 3rd Ed., Sec. 264 (1927); Reg. v. Salmon, 14 Cox
CrC. 494 (188o); Knight's case, v Lewin Cr. C. 168 (1828). Thus,
if a person is guilty of gross negligence in driving which results in killing
another, he is guilty of manslaughter at common law. Reg. v. Swindall,
2 Car. & K. 230, 2 Cox Cr. C. X4 (1846); Reg. v. Longbottom, 3
Cox Cr. C. 439 (1849); White v. State, 84 Ala. 421, 4 So. 598
(1887); People v. Falkovitch, 28o Ill. 321, 117 N.E. 398 (1917);
Smith v. State, 126 Ind. 252, 115 N.E. 943 (1917); Comm. v. Guil-
lemette, 243 Mass. 346, 137 N.E. 700 (1923). It is settled that there
are no common law crimes in Ohio. Vanvalkenburg v State of Ohio,
ii Ohio 405 (1842); Sutcliffe v. State, 18 Ohio 469, 51 Am. Dec.
459 (1849); State v. Rose, 89 Ohio St. 383, 386, io6 N.E. 50
(1914); State v. Hearn, 115 Ohio St. 340, 343, 154 N.E. 244
(1926). Therefore, unlike manslaughter at common law, the Ohio
conception does not recognize "gross" or "criminal" negligence as a
basis for a manslaughter charge in the first or second degree unless a
statute makes such act of negligence a criminal offense. 21 Ohio Jur.
Homicides, Sees. 22 and 27; Johnson v. State, 66 Ohio St. 59, 90 Am.
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St. Rep. 564, 6i L.R.A. 277, 63 N.E. 607 (1902); Martin v. State,
70 Ohio St. 219, 71 N.E. 640 (1904). Nor is there a statute in Ohio
making gross negligence an unlawful act. Such a serious hiatus has
enabled persons to avoid criminal punishment though their acts were
highly dangerous to the public. Thus, in the case at bar, if the defendant
were guilty of gross negligence in killing a person on a private road or
driveway, or even on a public highway, he would not be liable unless
the particular act he did was illegal by statute. The Ohio legislature
is the only body that can remedy the aforestated hiatus, and there would
seem to be good reason for it so doing.
In the principal cast the evidence definitely showed that the driveway
was not only open to all the public but also maintained at public expense.
Therefore, in the light of the preceding discussion, the driveway, in the
case at bar, fits into the definition of a public road or highway. The
fact that the General Assembly had not as yet granted a special per-
mission, under Sec. 23 of the Ohio Gen. Code, for a road does not
make the way any the less a public road for the purpose of the man-
slaughter statute. The defendance was found guilty by the jury, of
drunken driving and driving without due regard for public safety, thus,
violating the Ohio Gen. Code Secs. 126o3-i and 12628-1. Therefore,
the Supreme Court, it seems, could reasonably have held the defendant
amenable to the second-degree manslaughter statute.
WILLIAM T. CREME
WHAT ARE GAMES OF CHANCE AND LOTTERIES?
The plaintiff corporation claims to have conceived and is now operat-
ing short range shooting galleries in which the player pays ten cents and
is allowed three shots with a regulation .22 calibre rifle and attempts to
obliterate one of four small red figure "5"s printed in each corner of a
small rectangular white card target. If a player succeeds in obliterating
one of the figures, he is awarded the "Jack Pot," a fund consisting of
five dollars put up by the operators and increased by ten cents every time
all four of the figures have been shot at. It is alleged that the defendants
are operating galleries similar in every way to the plaintiff's except for
the target, which in the defendants' galleries are diamond shaped and
marked with the letter "J"; and the name, "Jack Pot Galleries." The
plaintiff seeks to enjoin the defendants from carrying on this line of
business which is alleged to be in unfair trade competition with the plain-
tiff's galleries. The chief defense is a frank claim that the business of
both parties violates the gaming laws and is therefore illegal and that a
